



University  
of Victoria  
Electrical &  
Computer  
Engineering

**PacRim-2019**



# Dynamic Games in Federated Learning Training


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
- **Introduction**
- **System Description**
- **Dynamic Games Formulation**
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- **Numerical Evaluation**






# System Description

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- Accuracy of machine learning model



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$$f_k(d'_{i,k}; \sigma_{i,k})$$


- Properties of  $f(d; \sigma)$

Given  $\sigma$

- ◆ Non-decreasing
- ◆ Concave
- ◆ Bounded


Given  $d$

- ◆ Decreasing with  $\sigma$




- Utility of MO  $i$

- ◆ **Benefit**



- ◆ **Cost**



- ◆ **Utility**

$$u_{i,k} = \zeta_{i,k} f(d_{i,k}; \sigma_{i,k}) - p_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k} - \frac{\alpha_k}{2} \left( \sum_i x_{i,k} d_{i,k} \right)^2$$



- Profit of MDG  $k$

- ◆ **Benefit**

$$\sum_i p_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k}$$

- ◆ **Cost**

$$\sum_i c_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k}$$



The diagram shows the term  $c_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k}$  from the cost equation. The coefficient  $c_{i,k}$  is enclosed in a light pink rectangular box. A black arrow originates from the top right corner of this box and points to a red rectangular box containing the text "Cost coef." in white.

- ◆ **Profit**

$$\Pi_k = \sum_i (p_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k} - c_{i,k} x_{i,k} d_{i,k})$$

## Two-Layer Heretical Game

- Lower level: MOs
  - Evolutionary Game
- Upper level: MDGs
  - Differential Game



## ■ Lower Level Game

### ● Replicator dynamics

$$\dot{x}_{i,k}(t) = x_{i,k}(t) \left( u_{i,k}(t) - \bar{u}_i(t) \right) \dots \dots (1)$$

Utility of MO  $i$   
selecting MDG  $k$

MO  $i$ 's average  
utility

$$\bar{u}_i(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K x_{i,k}(t) u_{i,k}(t)$$

## ■ Upper Level Game

### ● Optimal Control Problem(OCP)

$$\max_{p_k(t)} \int_0^T \Pi_k(t) dt$$

Accumulative Profit

$$\text{s. t. } \dot{x}_{i,k}(t) = x_{i,k}(t) \left( u_{i,k}(t) - \bar{u}_i(t) \right)$$

Lower Level  
Adaptation

$$\mathbf{x}_i(0) = \mathbf{x}_i^{(0)}, i \in \mathcal{N}$$

Initial Cond.

## ■ Equilibrium Analysis (Lower Level)

- Definition: The evolutionary equilibrium is the solution of the game defined in (1), i.e., replicator dynamics.

- Uniqueness of the equilibrium

Proved via *Cauchy- Lipschitz theorem*.

- Stability of the equilibrium


Proved via *Lyapunov's second method*.

## ■ Equilibrium Analysis (Upper Level)


- Solving the upper-level differential game is equivalent to solve  $K$  optimal control problems.
- The solution of OCP is further equivalent to maximize its corresponding Hamilton, defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathbf{p}_k(t)} \mathcal{H}_k(\mathbf{p}_k, \mathbf{p}_{-k}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}, \mathbf{x}) &= \Pi_k(\mathbf{p}_k) + \sum_i \sum_k \lambda_{i,k} \dot{x}_{i,k} \\ \text{s. t. } x_i(0) &= x_i^{(0)}, \lambda_{i,k}(T) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

| Parameter     | Setting          |
|---------------|------------------|
| $K$           | 3                |
| $N$           | 2                |
| $\sigma_i$    | [0.1, 0.15, 0.2] |
| $d_{i,k}$     | 4000             |
| $\zeta_{i,k}$ | 6                |



(a) Accuracy fitting




(b) Energy Consumption

### Accuracy and Energy Consumption Fitting




# Numerical Evaluation


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(a) Model owner 1





(b) Model owner 2



(a) Evolution trajectories

(b) Direction field

**Evolution trajectories of MOs' selections and direction field of the replicator dynamics**



## Pricing strategies of MDGs

- **Contributions**

- ✓ We devise a two-layer dynamic game model consists of the lower-level evolutionary game of the model owners and the upper-level differential game of mobile device groups.
- ✓ The solutions of the proposed two-layer dynamic game are analyzed theoretically and verified via numerical evaluations.

- **Future work:**

- ▣ Devise more realistic solution for the game, such as deep reinforcement learning based method.

**Questions & Answers**

**Thank you !**